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Anti-forensic tools, techniques and methods are becoming a formidable obstacle for the
digital forensic community. Thus, new research initiatives and strategies must be formu-
lated to address this growing problem. In this work we ﬁrst collect and categorize 308 anti-
digital forensic tools to survey the ﬁeld. We then devise an extended anti-forensic tax-
onomy to the one proposed by Rogers (2006) in order to create a more comprehensive
taxonomy and facilitate linguistic standardization. Our work also takes into consideration
anti-forensic activity which utilizes tools that were not originally designed for anti-
forensic purposes, but can still be used with malicious intent. This category was labeled
as Possible indications of anti-forensic activity, as certain software, scenarios, and digital
artifacts could indicate anti-forensic activity on a system. We also publicly share our data
sets, which includes categorical data on 308 collected anti-forensic tools, as well as 2780
unique hash values related to the installation ﬁles of 191 publicly available anti-forensic
tools. As part of our analysis, the collected hash set was ran against the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology's 2016 National Software Reference Library, and only 423
matches were found out of the 2780 hashes. Our ﬁndings indicate a need for future en-
deavors in creating and maintaining exhaustive anti-forensic hash data sets.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Digital forensics has garnered much attention over the
past ten to ﬁfteen years despite being a relatively nascent
scientiﬁc ﬁeld. This attention is due to the sheer amount of
data being generated by modern computer systems, which
has become an essential source of digital evidence (Geiger,
2005). Scientiﬁcally valid and lawful forensic investigation
of this digital evidence seeks to uncover and discern its
meaning where the evidence must be both reliable, accu-
rate and complete (Harris, 2006).K. Conlan), IBaggili@
u (F. Breitinger).
nhcfreg.com/, http://
vier Ltd. This is an open accThere has not been, however, as much attention, especially
in the form of academic research, towards what can be
deemed as “anti-digital forensics”, “anti-forensics”, or
“counter-forensics” (Baggili et al., 2012). Although, one could
argue that some research such as cryptography may be
regarded as anti-forensic, but has not been labeled as such in
the literature, thus skewing our perception of the amount of
anti-forensic research being conducted. Nonetheless, anti-
forensics generally means: attempts to compromise the avail-
ability or usefulness of evidence during the forensics process.
Of relevance to anti-forensics is the most recent high
proﬁle case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) vs.
Apple. The FBI had to bypass anti-forensic techniques to
acquire the iPhone 5C owned by the San Bernardino County,
California government issued to its employee, Syed Rizwan
Farook, one of the shooters involved in the December 2015
San Bernardino attack that killed 14 people and injured 22.ess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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locked with a four-digit password hindering the forensic
acquisition process due to built-in anti-forensic techniques
that enforce encryption and auto-wiping the device after
multiple unsuccessful password attempts. The legal case
where the FBI attempted to order Apple to help with gaining
access to data on the device is complex and beyond this
paper's scope. Eventually, evidence from iPhone 5C was ac-
quired due to a zero day exploit. The magnitude of this case
clearly exempliﬁes the need of both researchers and practi-
tioners to gain a more comprehensive multidisciplinary
understanding of the impact of anti-forensics on the digital
forensic community at large.1
As shown in the FBI vs. Apple case, anti-forensics makes
investigations of digital media more difﬁcult and time-
consuming, and thus, more expensive. Users can use anti-
forensic tools and techniques to remove, alter, disrupt, or
otherwise interfere with evidence of criminal activities on
digital systems, similar to how criminals would remove
evidence from crime scenes in the physical realm.
Over time, as put forth by Harris (2006), there has been
an increase in criminals using anti-forensic methods to
counter the forensics process, as well as interfere with the
evidence itself. This is evident by the thriving market for
software tools that can be considered “anti-forensic” in
nature; Geiger (2005) highlighted that there are in fact
entire software packages that are designed for anti-digital
forensic purposes. These tools can help circumvent
widely adopted digital forensic tools and techniques.
Moreover, Garﬁnkel (2007) emphasized that tools that can
evade forensic processes are widely accessible.
With that said, Baggili et al. (2012) pointed out the lack of
academic research pertaining speciﬁcally to anti-forensics,
as compared to the more traditional research on digital fo-
rensics. In their work they illustrated that only 2% of their
data set of 500 digital forensic research papers focused on
anti-forensics. This is likely due to the fact that much anti-
forensic innovation occurs outside of academic literature.
This problem means that the digital forensics commu-
nity, including the academic sector, must start considering
and formulating mitigation strategies towards the growing
problem of anti-digital forensics (Thuen, 2007). Our work
aims to address this developing obstacle through an original
research initiative by understanding the existing tools and
techniques, augmented with devising a taxonomy that em-
bodies anti-digital forensic tools and techniques e thus
aiding the systematization of the knowledge in this domain.
The contribution of our work is to provide the following
resources to the scientiﬁc community:
 A categorical data set on 308 collected tools which can be
considered anti-forensic in nature, including important
variables for each of the tools, such as anti-forensic
capability, developing party, country of origin, etc,
(shown in Section 3.2). This data set is publicly available.21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI-Apple_encryption_dispute
(last accessed 2016-02-10).
2 Data can be downloaded from http://www.unhcfreg.com by going to
Data & Tools section. An extended version of the Rogers (2006) anti-computer
forensic taxonomy, making it more robust and deﬁnitive.
This extension includes deeper, more granular speciﬁca-
tions within the existing classiﬁcations set forth (shown
in Fig. 1). Taxonomies are useful for scientiﬁc ﬁelds; they
provide structured classiﬁcations within a domain.
 The calculated hash values of 2780 unique installation
related ﬁles derived from the categorized anti-forensic
tools, and an analysis of their presence in the newest
2016 National Software Reference Library (NSRL).3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
Relatedworkwe discuss related literature.We then present
our methodology in Section Methodology. After that, we
present our results and discuss them in Section Results and
discussion, and we present our proposed extended anti-
digital forensic taxonomy in Fig. 1. Lastly, we present the
limitations of our work in Section Limitations and conclude
in Section Conclusion and future work.
Related work
Deﬁning anti-digital forensics
As previously mentioned, anti-digital forensics is of
growing interest to cybercriminal investigators and aca-
demics. However, there is still a lack of a formal deﬁnition
for the term, as pointed out by Harris (2006). Without a
standardized deﬁnition that can be agreed upon, practi-
tioners and scientists will be inclined to counter anti-digital
forensics with their own deﬁnitions, based on their own
experiences, which will vary.
With the rise of cybercrime, as well as the amount of
software which can be used to interfere with forensic in-
vestigations, practitioners must be able to identify the same
anti-forensic activity that others have encountered in past
experiences. A formal deﬁnition of anti-digital forensics, as
well as shared terms that are pertinent to anti-digital foren-
sics can facilitate the sharing of knowledge, and allow for
bettermitigation strategies. It would therefore be appropriate
to ﬁrst highlight how past work deﬁned anti-digital forensics.
Table 1 displays previous deﬁnitions of anti-forensics.
From these deﬁnitions, it can be seen that over time, a
majority of the deﬁnitions emphasize that anti-forensics
can be identiﬁed by any attempts to alter, disrupt, negate,
or in any way interfere with scientiﬁcally valid forensic
investigations. We note that our adopted deﬁnition also
encompasses techniques and tools that might have not
been intended to be anti-forensic, such as Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs) and built-in privacy enhancing technol-
ogies such as encryption. We adopt this deﬁnition in our
research for the creation of our extended taxonomy of anti-
digital forensics.
Approaching the problem of anti-digital forensics
In addressing anti-digital forensics, it would be appro-
priate to become familiar with previous attempts that3 http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/ (last accessed 2016-02-10).
Fig. 1. Extended taxonomy.
Table 1
Previous deﬁnitions of anti-forensics.
Author(s) Deﬁnition of anti-forensics provided
Shirani (2002) Hiding a system intrusion attempt
Peron and Legary (2005) Attempt to limit the identiﬁcation, collection, collation and validation of electronic data
Grugq (2005) Attempting to limit the quantity and quality of forensic evidence
Foster and Liu (2005) Breaking tools or avoiding detection
Rogers (2006) Attempts to negatively affect the existence, amount, and/or quality of evidence from a crime scene,
or make the examination of evidence difﬁcult or impossible to conduct
Liu and Brown (2006) Application of the scientiﬁc method to digital media in order to invalidate factual information for
judicial review
Harris (2006) Any attempts to compromise the availability or usefulness of evidence to the forensics process
Kessler (2007) Set of tools, methods, and processes that hinder forensic analysis
Garﬁnkel (2007) A growing collection of tools and techniques that frustrate forensic tools, investigations and
investigators
Berinato (2007) An approach to criminal hacking that can be summed like this: make it hard for them to ﬁnd you and
impossible for them to prove they found you
Sremack and Antonov (2007) The practice of thwarting a proper forensic investigation
Dahbur and Mohammad (2012) Scientiﬁc methods are used to simply frustrate forensics efforts at all forensics stages
Albano et al. (2011) Methods undertaken in order to thwart the digital investigation process conducted by legitimate
forensic investigators
Stamm et al. (2012) Disguising manipulation ﬁngerprints or falsifying device speciﬁc ﬁngerprints inadvertently
introduced when a digital ﬁle is formed
K. Conlan et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S66eS75S68address the domain as a whole. Several works exist that
attempt to deﬁne the sub-domain of anti-digital forensics,
and point towards future methods that can address the
growing problem.
Thuen (2007) conducted a survey that explored the
forensic side of computer security, with a speciﬁc focus onthe methods and ramiﬁcations of anti-forensic techniques.
Thework concluded that a familiaritywith counter-forensic
techniques at the various stages of a digital forensic inves-
tigation is required for practitioners. Pajek and Pimenidis
(2009) explored the problem of anti-forensics at various
stages of a computer forensic investigation, from both a
K. Conlan et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S66eS75 S69theoretical and practical standpoint. Broad descriptions of
many anti-forensic tools and their methods was provided
by Kessler (2007), using the traditional anti-forensics tax-
onomy (i.e., data hiding, artifact wiping, trail obfuscation,
and attacks on forensic tools themselves).
As put forth by Harris (2006), there are no general or
contemporary frameworks with which to analyze and
gauge the anti-forensics situation. Wundram et al. (2013)
classiﬁed and presented both established and newer at-
tacks on digital forensic tools; an argument is made in the
work that digital forensic tool testing must develop in
parallel with anti-forensic developments. The same view
was shared by Anobah et al. (2014) in terms of testing if
mobile forensic tools continue to operate in the presence of
anti-forensic techniques.
A theoretical framework to deﬁne counter-forensics was
introduced by B€ohme and Kirchner (2013), and is extended
to include forensic analysis and authentication re-
quirements. A terminology was then created through a
technical survey of counter-forensics against image foren-
sics with a focus on trace suppression and authentication
interference; examples and brief evaluations were pro-
vided, along with a discussion of relations to other domains
in multimedia security.
Sremack and Antonov (2007) highlighted the issue that
if anti-forensics succeeds, evidence will fail the Daubert
standard.4 To resolve this challenge, the authors suggested
a classiﬁcation of anti-forensic threats similar to related
ﬁelds (e.g., digital security). A robust taxonomy was thus
created, with the goal of accounting for all types of in-
vestigations (i.e., internal, civil, criminal) and threats (i.e.,
threats to digital evidence, threats to legal process/admis-
sibility). They acknowledge that their taxonomy has limi-
tations in scope, and specify that they would like to expand
their taxonomy in future work.
Highlighted by Brand (2007) was the growing sophis-
tication of anti-forensic techniques used by malicious
software (malware). The work discussed the exhaustive list
of anti-forensic techniques utilized by malware (e.g.,
obfuscation, anti-disassembly, encrypted and compressed
data, data destruction, anti-debugging, etc.). The work also
addressed the fact that automated detection and classiﬁ-
cation work is progressing in the ﬁeld, which includes
statistical structures such as assembly instructions, system
calls, systemdependence graphs, and classiﬁcation through
machine learning.
Attempts at anti-digital forensic classiﬁcation and
characterization
In this section we review previous attempts at the
classiﬁcation, identiﬁcation, and characterization of anti-
digital forensic tools. These works were conducted with
the purpose of creating structured resources for the digital
forensic community.
While there are a few general groupings of anti-forensic
methods that aid in the analysis of anti-digital forensics4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard (last accessed 2016-
02-10).(Harris, 2006), there is yet to be identiﬁable groupings of
anti-digital forensic software based on an extensive anal-
ysis of widely available tools. As noted, there have been
previous proposals with regards to anti-forensics; Peron
and Legary (2005) divide anti-forensic techniques into
four categories: an adversary can destroy, hide, manipulate
or prevent the creation of evidence. Other categories were
proposed by Rogers (2006): data hiding, artifact wiping,
trail obfuscation and attacks against both the forensic
process and forensic tools. This taxonomy is widely adopted
in digital forensics research. While these past attempts are
useful in classifying and categorizing anti-forensic
methods, to the best of our knowledge, there is no cur-
rent research that fully accounts for the categorization of
anti-forensic software. In the few cases that do exist, they
often focus only on segments of anti-forensics (Harris,
2006), or only on a select number of tools.
Garﬁnkel (2007) presented a survey of contemporary
anti-forensic tools (e.g., Timestomp, Transmogrify, etc.).5
Discussed were approaches for direct attacks against
forensic tools focusing especially on the exploitation of
software bugs within forensic tools themselves (e.g., data
validation failures, denial of service attacks, fragile heuris-
tics, etc.). Also evaluated was the effectiveness of anti-
forensic tools against traditional forensic tools. Lastly,
strategies towards anti-forensic detection and counter-
measures were outlined.
The challenges of anti-forensics were also highlighted
by Dahbur and Mohammad (2012). They provided a clas-
siﬁcation of anti-forensic mechanisms, tools, and tech-
niques, and evaluated their effectiveness. Challenges of
countermeasures against anti-forensics, along with a set of
recommendations for future research were also discussed.
Addressed by Smith (2007) was the issue that disk-
avoiding anti-forensic tools are growing in use, and
needed to be described and categorized. This work built on
existing categories to classify anti-forensic methods, and
provided information to facilitate the understanding of
contemporary trends in anti-forensics.
Lastly, Blunden (2009) examined approaches that an
investigator may use towards persistent rootkits (e.g. de-
fense in depth, static analysis of an unknown executable,
etc.), as well as identiﬁed the anti-forensic possibilities that
rootkits may employ.Attempts at the detection and indication of anti-digital
forensic tool usage
A theoretical approach to digital investigations, inwhich
the investigation process is at all times aware of the pos-
sibility of anti-forensic attacks was presented by Rekhis and
Boudriga (2012). The work created an investigated system
scenario, the deployed security solution, and a library of
anti-forensic attacks that are used against the system, with
the resulting evidence being collected. Then, an inference
system was proposed to mitigate anti-forensic attacks.
Potential scenarios were then generated from the anti-5 http://www.metasploit.com/ (last accessed 2016-02-10).
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that can occur during digital investigations.
Other past work by Geiger (2005) focused on the anal-
ysis of six anti-forensic tools (WindowWasher, CyberScrub
Professional, SecureClean, Evidence Eliminator, and Acronis
Privacy Expert). The analysis, which consisted of observa-
tion of the tools' performance by examining the disk im-
ages with Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) concluded that signiﬁcant
shortfalls were discovered in each anti-forensic tool
examined (e.g., incomplete wiping of unallocated space),
that could permit the recovery of evidentiary data. In
addition, it was pointed out that each tool had a “ﬁnger-
print” (i.e., operational signature) that can be used to
identify the application's usage.
A forensic tool capable of extracting and analyzing
forensic data from the ﬁle system of a created “honeypot”
(i.e., a system intended to be used as a testing ground for
anti-forensic tools), was introduced by Fairbanks et al.
(2007). TimeKeeper, the journal-monitoring prototype
developed was able to detect anti-forensic attempts, and
capture previously unavailable forensic information. This
information can be used to facilitate system recovery,
research attack techniques, provide insight into attacker
motives, and criminal investigations.
An active project titled Indicators of Anti-Forensics
(IOAF) serves as an effort towards automatic anti-forensic
trace detection using signature based methods was pre-
sented by James (2014). The developed program uses
parsing modules to extract ﬁle metadata and registry key
information from an investigated system. Predeﬁned sig-
natures previously stored in a database are queried for each
extracted object, to see if the object consistently corre-
sponds to a signature.
It should be clear that the idea of automatic detection
and indication of anti-digital forensic activity is well worth
further research and initiatives. Our work aims to build
upon the endeavors of these previous works while forming
a comprehensive taxonomy to improve the digital forensics
body of knowledge.
Methodology
We used a methodical approach in order to create the
data set of anti-forensic tools. The methodology we
executed included the following overarching steps:
Data set creation: An extensive web search was con-
ducted for software considered to be anti-forensic and the
software was identiﬁed and downloaded. More details on
this step are provided in Section Preliminary research and
collection of anti-digital forensic tools. A data set of anti-
forensic tools was then created from the downloaded
applications.
Data set organization: In this step, we assigned
descriptive and identifying variables (e.g. anti-forensic
category, subcategories, developer, ﬁrst release, etc.) that
pertained to each tool.
Data set analysis: We analyzed the collected and
organized data from the prior step to produce summary
information.Hashing: As many of the installation (e.g. .exe, .zip.,
.msi) ﬁles of the programs that were accessible (n ¼ 191)
were then hashed so that we could store each anti-forensic
tool's computed hash value. Additionally, after some of the
.zip ﬁles were unzipped, more of the resulting ﬁles
(n ¼ 2780 unique hashes) were also hashed.
Data set comparisonwith NSRL: The data set of hashes
were then searched for in the NSRL database.
Extended taxonomy creation: Based on previous work,
as well as the thorough categorization of each of the
downloaded anti-forensic tools, our proposed extended
taxonomy was conceived, which is shown in Fig. 1.
Preliminary research and collection of anti-digital forensic
tools
The tools identiﬁed in this work were collected through
extensive and exhaustive web searches as well as the
searching of open-source repositories.
Keywords used in these web searches included “Best
anti-digital forensics tools”, “Most popular anti-digital
forensic tools”, “Popular anti-digital forensic software”,
“Best anti-computer forensic tools” etc. “Best”, “Most Pop-
ular”, and similar keywords were implemented heavily to
systematically ﬁnd a sample of anti-digital forensic tools
that would best reﬂect the tools used most often in anti-
digital forensic activities.
Categorical data set of 308 anti-forensic tools
For each tool we determined the following identifying
parameters (in some cases, this data was simply
unavailable):
I Anti-digital forensic tool name
II Anti-forensic category I
III Anti-forensic subcategory II
IV Anti-forensic subcategory III
V Web address
VI Operating system/platform
VII Country of origin
VIII Developer
IX Organizational type
X Date of ﬁrst release
XI Latest version
XII License
XIII Currently Maintained? (yes/no)
XIV Programming language of development
The created categorical data set, which contains all of
these documented variables, can be downloaded from
http://www.unhcfreg.com under Data & Tools. We hope
that members of the digital forensic community would
beneﬁt from this data set.
Extended taxonomy of anti-digital forensics
We designed an extended version of the widely
accepted taxonomy of anti-forensics, previously devised by
K. Conlan et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S66eS75 S71Rogers (2006). Our goal was to provide a more speciﬁed,
granular organized body of knowledge that could better
characterize the growing domain of anti-digital forensics.
Below is the original taxonomy of anti-forensics:Original anti-forensics taxonomy proposed by
Rogers (2006).
 Data hiding
e Encryption
e Steganography
e Other forms of data hiding
 Artifact wiping
e Disk cleaning utilities
e File wiping
e Disk degaussing/destruction techniques
 Trail obfuscation
 Attacks against computer forensic tools and
processesWhile the original taxonomy of anti-forensics provided
the pillar to our extended taxonomy, expanding it to amore
granular level was a necessary step due to the growing
expansion and complexity of the domain. An extended
taxonomy of the domain must thus reﬂect this trend and
provide an evolving structure of anti-forensics.
Creating a taxonomy is as much about the tools and
techniques as it is about the users. In digital forensics,
practitioners will always face varying challenges, and thus
this taxonomy was designed to capture as many possible
situations a potential practitioner may encounter. The
taxonomy was developed as a granular, wide-scoped clas-
siﬁcation scheme, as opposed to a controlled vocabulary or
hierarchical structure design. Breadth and depth were both
of interest in the design process. We are open to future
modiﬁcations and alterations.Hash value generation and comparison to NSRL
TheMD5, SHA1, SHA-256, CRC32, SHA-512 and SHA-384
hash values of 2780 unique installation-related ﬁles
(Windows .exe ﬁles preferred, in cases of multiple plat-
forms) of the anti-digital forensic tools were generated
using the HashMyFiles,6 a utility that allows a user to
generate the aforementioned hashes of multiple ﬁles on a
system. These hash values can be downloaded from http://
www.unhcfreg.com under Data & Tools. Not all 308
installation ﬁles were accessed and downloaded due to a
number of the tools being proprietary. The 2780 unique
hash values were then compared to the newest 2016 NSRL
hash data set.6 http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash_my_ﬁles.html (last accessed 2016-
02-10).Results and discussion
Extended taxonomy of anti-digital forensics
The taxonomy was characterized by the need to
identify all aspects of anti-digital forensics that may exist
on a system, as it is crucial that ﬁrst responders, in-
vestigators, and researchers understand what forms of
anti-forensic activity may exist on a system or network.
Our resultant taxonomy is depicted in Fig. 1. We discuss
and present the results of our efforts in the sections that
follow.
Data hiding
With regards to data hiding, the original taxonomy
included encryption, steganography and other forms of data
hiding as its sub categories. Supplemental in our extended
taxonomy is the identiﬁcation of important subcategories,
as well as an articulation of the other forms of data hiding
category (i.e. data contraception, ﬁlesystem manipulation,
hard disk manipulation, memory hiding, and network-based
hiding, respectively).
Encrypting data on a machine is the quickest method
to prevent access to stored data. The extended taxonomy
expounded largely upon the encryption category, due
to a multitude of encryption techniques that can take
place on a system, or the peripherals of a system, on
different data types. It is important to differentiate be-
tween these forms of encryption to better prepare
practitioners with what they may encounter on the ﬁeld,
or researchers for what they may encounter during their
research.
Disk encryption was identiﬁed as a vital category; the
exponential growth of storage media on systems has led to
the development of tools that can encrypt the full volume
of a hard drive. Additionally with the overall growth in user
produced data we see a paralleled increase in the usage of
databases to store the data; database encryption is thus
another form of data hiding.
It was also deemed necessary to identify folder
encryption (both single user and multi-user), as well as
ﬁle encryption (both single and multi-user). Instances of
email encryption, application encryption, cloud service
encryption, portable disk encryption, and mobile device
encryption are increasing, and thus included in our pro-
posed extended taxonomy. This is evident due to the
large amounts of tools identiﬁed for these encryption
purposes.
Of interest were also tools that allow for or
enhance data-in-transit/network protocol encryption, as
encrypted network trafﬁc can greatly hinder the network
forensic process. These types of tools are gaining popu-
larity, especially by users with privacy concerns. The
extended taxonomy thus included these forms of
encryption.
The area of steganographywas not greatly adjusted from
what was identiﬁed in the original taxonomy; all that was
modiﬁed was the identiﬁcation of the four forms of steg-
anography that may occur digitally: video, audio, images,
and text. What was included, however, was ﬁlesystem
steganography, as this was an emerging steganography type
Table 2
Number of tools per category.
Data hiding (153) Artifact wiping (113)
Encryption (127) File wiping (27)
Disk (46) Disk wiping (28)
Email (9) Removable disk wiping (3)
File (19) Generic data wiping (23)
Filesystem (9) Registry wiping (29)
Data-in-transit/network
protocol (14)
Disk degaussing/destruction
techniques (2)
Password (7) Metadata wiping (1)
Mobile device (8) Trail obfuscation (38)
Portable drive (5) P2P networking (33)
Application (2) IP address spooﬁng (1)
Cloud service (3) Data fabrication (2)
Programming language (2) Data misdirection/
misinformation (1)
Library (3) Proxy server (1)
Steganography (16) Attacks against forensic tools
& processes (4)
Image (4) Program packers (4)
Text (9)
Filesystem (3)
Data contraception (1)
Syscall proxying (1)
Filesystem manipulation (2)
Slack-space hiding (2)
Memory hiding (1)
Memory-sharing
emulators (1)
Network-based data hiding (6)
Terminal emulators (3)
VPN tunneling (3)
K. Conlan et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S66eS75S72identiﬁed in our research (e.g., Magikfs7e a steganographic
ﬁle system for Linux).
A challenge we faced in the creation of our extended
taxonomy was the categorization of “encryption suites”,
i.e., software suites that provide numerous cryptographic
features. Future work could involve a methodology devel-
oped to successfully categorize these tools.
The following subcategories of data hiding were identi-
ﬁed in the research as an articulation of the other forms of
data hiding category from the original taxonomy; Data
contraceptionwas introduced as a new category within data
hiding. It can be deﬁned as anti-forensic activities that
produces little to no digital trace evidence, thus having
great potential to defeat forensic investigations. This cate-
gory includes syscall proxying, remote library injections,
direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM), and portable apps.
Added to the category of data hiding were the sub-
categories of ﬁlesystem manipulation and hard disk manip-
ulation. These subcategories of data hiding were deemed
part of the new taxonomy due cases existing inwhich items
are hidden on systems through the deliberatemanipulation
of ﬁlesystems and hard disks.
Memory hiding was seen as another form of data hiding
for inclusion into the extended taxonomy. Utilizing a sys-
tem's memory to hide data is potentially devastating to
forensic investigations due to the high level of training
required to defeat these attempts.
Using a network to hide data must also be considered in
digital forensic investigations; such anti-forensic activities
would include Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunneling and
the use of proxy servers and terminal emulators. Thus, a
category identiﬁed as network-based hidingwas established
as well.
Artifact wiping
The artifact wiping category was extended to include the
different types of “wiping” (i.e., the deliberate destruction
of data that could be used as evidence) which was not fully
afﬁrmed in the original taxonomy.
Based on our analysis of the collected data set, there are
vast amounts of software that can be used to wipe different
forms of data: ﬁles, disks, removable/portable disks, logs,
metadata, and registries. A large number of tools performed
more than one form of wiping; they were classiﬁed as
generic data wiping.
Artifact wiping, alongside data hiding, based on the large
amount of tools that were found for each of those respec-
tive categories, shown in Table 2, is likely to remain a
popular form of evidence destruction and manipulation,
based on the considerable number of tools that can perform
these functions.
Trail obfuscation
Trail obfuscation, i.e., the deliberate activity to disorient
and divert a forensic investigation on a digital system or
network included what Rogers (2006) had originally
speciﬁed (i.e. log cleaners, different forms of spooﬁng,
misinformation, backbone hopping, zombie accounts, and7 http://magikfs.sourceforge.net/ (last accessed 2016-02-10).trojan commands). Added was P2P networking, which is a
popular form of trail obfuscation; P2P software has been
noted as easily being misused for criminal activity (e.g.,
copyright infringement, malware dissemination, etc.).
It is likely that trail obfuscation activities will increase,
alongside the rise in cybercrime, given that criminals will
naturally attempt to mitigate “ﬁngerprints” that provide
evidence of their crimes, and might employ the tools and
techniques at their disposal to confuse and mislead
investigators.
Attacks against forensic tools and processes
Direct attacks against the software used to investigate
digital media, as well as against the processes employed
during these investigations have the potential to be the
most devastating anti-digital forensic activity to an
investigation.
This section of the original taxonomy was extended to
include key areas that have not been formerly addressed;
program packers, anti-reverse engineering, and attacks
against the integrity of investigating parties.
Program packers can be used against forensic tools and
processes by hindering the forensic process as they allow
for the compression, and, in some cases with certain pro-
gram packers, the encryption of data.
Anti-reverse engineering also needs to be considered in a
taxonomy of anti-forensics as criminals will naturally
attempt to deﬂect attempts by investigators to extract in-
formation from suspected artifacts. While program packers
are technically a form of anti-reverse engineering, the two
were separately categorized; as more speciﬁed forms of
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be updated to include them.
A newer concept added to the taxonomy was attacks
against the integrity of forensic investigators, which was
added to the taxonomy, given that it is within the realm of
possibility that criminals may attempt a smear campaign,
frame, or perform other malicious activities to attack the
integrity of organizations tasked with the legal investiga-
tion of computer criminal cases.
Possible indications of anti-digital forensic activity
Investigators are now forced to develop a “situational
awareness” when it comes to digital forensics, due to the
sheer volume of criminal cases, increasing at an exponen-
tial rate. Being able to quickly and efﬁciently locate any
potential of anti-digital forensic activity is now a require-
ment for successful investigations.
What needs to be understood is that there may be ac-
tivity or software on a system that may not appear to be
criminal or illicit, but a practitioner will still need to be
open to the fact that there are tools that can be used for
anti-forensic purposes, despite not being createdwith anti-
forensics in mind.
Possible indications of anti-digital forensic activity can be
rather straightforward; the very presence of anti-forensic
software and ﬁles can obviously be giveaways. The instal-
lation ﬁles for cryptographic software, for example, should
offer an investigator the “low-hanging fruit” indication that
data may be encrypted on a system.
An example of a possible indication of anti-digital
forensic activity would be an encrypted virtual machine
on a host system. Such a scenario would have the beneﬁt of
hiding all application, temporary ﬁle storage, and other
items in a virtual environment, and would be stored as a
single ﬁle, which later can be deleted.
For anti-forensics to be better understood and devel-
oped, as well as that of anti-anti-forensics, i.e., the mitiga-
tion and solution strategies arrayed against anti-forensics,
this category should be further articulated and expounded
upon by the digital forensic community.Comparing anti-forensic tool hashes to the NSRL
A Python script was written to acquire 2780 unique
MD5 and SHA1 hash values of the anti-forensic tool
installation-related ﬁles, and was compared against the
newest 2016 Reference Data Set (RDS).8 Out of the 2780
unique hashes, 423 distinct hashes were found to be in the
most current 2016 version of the RDS at the time of writing
this paper. The hash data set was also compared against the
hashes of NIST provided operating systems installed on
virtual machines, with no further matches beyond the 423
found in the RDS. This was an important ﬁnding, as the
unmatched hashes would be examples of Presence of anti-
forensics tools/ﬁles/installation ﬁles under the category of
Possible indications of anti-digital forensics, as represented in
our newly expanded taxonomy of anti-digital forensics.8 This was conducted with the help of Douglas White at NIST.This ﬁnding warrants further research in creating known
hash sets related to anti-forensic tools.
Quantitative analysis of the data set of anti-forensic
tools
Table 2 displays the number of tools found at various
levels of the taxonomy, i.e., the speciﬁc forms of data hiding,
artifact wiping, trail obfuscation, and attacks against forensic
tools and processes. These tools and their respective anti-
forensic capabilities are recorded within our categorical
data set, which can be downloaded from http://www.
unhcfreg.com under Data & Tools.
To note, the majority of tools categorized were of the
primary data hiding and artifact wiping categories, and
within those, ﬁle, ﬁlesystem, disk, and email encryptionmade
up the majority of data hiding tools, and ﬁle, disk, generic
data, and registry wiping made up the majority of artifact
wiping tools found in our data set. This should be expected,
as these tools have historically been prevalent in
computing.
Additionally, with regards to trail obfuscation, a large
number of P2P networking software was found during the
research. This ﬁnding, as well as that of the previously
mentioned large quantities of encryption and data wiping
tools found, should be of interest to the forensic
community.
Fig. 2 displays the identiﬁed instances of operating
systems and platforms for which speciﬁc anti-digital
forensic tools were developed. It should not come as a
surprise that Windows, Macintosh, and Linux made up the
vast majority of identiﬁed operating systems in the
research, considering that they are the most prominent
operating systems.
Multi-platform/unspeciﬁed was a category with a high
number, reﬂecting that numerous tools had versions for
more than one unspeciﬁed operating system, or no oper-
ating system was speciﬁed by the developing party. Some
of these tools were simply described as “cross-platform”, or
no speciﬁc platforms were identiﬁable during the research.
The presence of anti-digital forensic tools for mobile
operating systems, e.g., Windows Phone, iOS, and Android,
in the view of the researchers, is a component of anti-
forensic research that will require more attention, due to
the growing ubiquity of mobile devices in our society, and
thus the paralleled growth in their adoption for criminal
activity.
We also compiled a list of the countries of origin of a
number of the anti-digital forensic tools, as well as the
developing party's organizational type (not all, due to a
number of the sources for the tools not alluding to their
respective countries of origins or a speciﬁc organization
type).
With regards to Fig. 3, it is of interest that a large
number of anti-digital forensic tools were identiﬁed as
originating from Germany and Finland. It would be inter-
esting to further examine why these two countries were
reﬂected in the results, as opposed to say, Russia and China.
Additionally, further research on how the anti-digital
forensic landscape has changed over time would be inter-
esting, by exploring if the amounts of tools from each of
Fig. 2. Identiﬁed operating systems and platforms.
Fig. 3. Identiﬁed countries of origin of a number of the anti-forensic tools.
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increases or decreases.
155 anti-digital forensic tools from the data set had data
on their organizational type of the developing entity. It was
found that 46 of the tools were developed by non-
commercial entities. The non-commercial organizations
most certainly developed the anti-digital forensic tools that
were designed with “privacy” and “open-source” philoso-
phies in mind, e.g., P2P networking, steganography, and
encryption tools. 98 of the 155 tools were created by
commercial entities. This is to be expected, due to the large
number of data hiding and artifact wiping software that is
certainly being developed by commercial enterprises for
corporate and personal use. A much smaller amount of
tools were found to be created by military and academic
organizations (one and ten, respectively).Further research into the origins of anti-digital forensic
tools and their developing parties, alongside other vari-
ables, could help facilitate the continued mitigation efforts
of the anti-digital forensic problem.
Limitations
A considerable limitation of this work was that the sheer
number of software tools that may be considered “anti-
forensic” in nature is incredibly vast and continuously
growing, and it is extremely difﬁcult to determine the entire
scope of the domain. This is, however, not as much a “limi-
tation” as it is an opportunity for future research endeavors.
An additional limitation of the categorical data set and
extended taxonomywas the failure to fully cover newer, yet
hard to articulate ﬁelds of anti-digital forensics. For
example, not only is the domain of “cloud service forensics”
K. Conlan et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S66eS75 S75still nascent and not fully deﬁned, the ﬁeld of “anti-cloud
service forensics” needs research attention as well.
Conclusion and future work
The goal of this work was the following: to create a
categorical data set that would be useful to the digital
forensic community through the collection and organiza-
tion of 308 anti-forensic tools, including speciﬁcation of
their possible anti-forensic usages on a system. Another
goal was to create an extended classiﬁcation of the original
anti-forensics taxonomy, with the purpose of encapsulating
the possibilities within the domain of anti-forensics.
Future work could include expanding the scope of the
categorical data set to include more tools, of which there
are many. Based on the results, collecting identiﬁable in-
formation on anti-digital forensic tools, and then formu-
lating it into an accessible body of knowledge has the
potential to beneﬁt and assist digital forensic practitioners.
With the migration of the Internet into devices not usu-
ally connected to networks, i.e., the “internet-of-things”,
anti-digital forensic software and tools will follow this dig-
ital migration. We can only assume that anti-digital forensic
activity will reach these newly-connected devices. Expand-
ing the taxonomy to include not just the classiﬁcations of
anti-digital forensic tools and methods, but also the forms of
digital devices that such activity could occur on would be
beneﬁcial to researchers and practitioners as well.
It would be interesting to see a similar methodology, i.e.,
that of the collection, identiﬁcation, and categorization of
software tools extended to other ﬁelds of the information
assurance domain. For example, resources established that
could identify and centralize information on software tools
used by malicious hackers to penetrate systems and net-
works could prove useful to the forensic and security
communities alike.
Lastly, ways of automating the process of classifying
anti-forensic tools may be of interest to scientists working
in computational linguistics, as this could possibly be done
by parsing metadata of tools online and leveraging ma-
chine learning. Continued research on this work, as well as
in the domain in general, would prove beneﬁcial to miti-
gating the growing problem of anti-digital forensics.
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